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Abstract— This paper considers a sensor attack and fault
detection problem for linear cyber-physical systems, which
are subject to system noise that can obey an unknown light-
tailed distribution. We propose a new threshold-based detection
mechanism that employs the Wasserstein metric, and which
guarantees system performance with high confidence employing
a finite number of measurements. The proposed detector may
generate false alarms with a rate ∆ in normal operation, where
∆ can be tuned to be arbitrarily small by means of a benchmark
distribution which is part of our mechanism. Thus, the proposed
detector is sensitive to sensor attacks and faults which have a
statistical behavior that is different from that of the system
noise. We quantify the impact of stealthy attacks—which aim
to perturb the system operation while producing false alarms
that are consistent with the natural system noise—via a prob-
abilistic reachable set. To enable tractable implementation of
our methods, we propose a linear optimization problem that
computes the proposed detection measure and a semidefinite
program that produces the proposed reachable set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are physical processes that
are tightly integrated with computation and communication
systems for monitoring and control. Examples include crit-
ical infrastructure, such as transportation networks, energy
distribution systems, and the Internet. These systems are
usually complex, large-scale and insufficiently supervised,
making them vulnerable to attacks [1], [2]. A significant
literature has studied various denial of service [3], false
data-injection [4], [5], replay [6], [7], sensor, and integrity
attacks [8]–[11]. The majority of these works study attack-
detection problems in a control-theoretical framework. This
approach essentially employs detectors to identify abnormal
behaviors by comparing estimation and measurements under
some predefined metrics. However, attacks could be stealthy,
and exploit knowledge of the system structure, uncertainty
and noise information to inflict significant damage on the
physical system while avoiding detection. This motivates
the characterization of the impact of stealthy attacks via
e.g. reachability set analysis [9], [12], [13]. To ensure com-
putational tractability, these works assume either Gaussian
or bounded system noise. However, these assumptions fall
short in modeling all natural disturbances that can affect
a system. Such systems would be vulnerable to stealthy
attacks that disguise themselves via an intentionally selected,
unbounded and non-Gaussian distribution. When designing
detectors, an added difficulty is in obtaining tractable com-
putations that can handle these more general distributions.
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More recently, novel measure of concentration has opened
the way for online tractable and robust attack detection with
probability guarantees under uncertainty. A first attempt in
this direction is [14], where a Chebyshev inequality is used
to design a detector and, an assessment of the impact of
stealthy attacks is given, under the assumption that system
noises were bounded. With the aim of obtaining a less
conservative detection mechanism, we leverage an alternative
measure-concentration result via Wasserstein metric. This
metric is built from data gathered on the system, and
can provide concentration result significantly sharper than
that via Chebyshev inequality. In particular, we address
the following question for linear CPSs: How to design an
online attack-detection mechanism that is robust to light-
tailed distributions of system noise while remaining sensitive
to attacks and limiting the impact of the stealthy attack?
To answer the question, we consider a sensor-attack de-
tection problem on a linear dynamical system. The linear
system models a remotely-observed process that is subject to
an additive noise described by an unknown, not-necessarily
bounded, light-tailed distribution. To identify abnormal be-
havior, we employ a steady-state Kalman filter as well as a
benchmark distribution of an offline sequence corresponding
to the normal system operation. In this framework, we pro-
pose a novel detection mechanism that achieves online and
robust attack detection of stealthy attacks in high confidence.
Statement of Contributions: 1) We propose a novel de-
tection measure, which employs the Wasserstein distance
between the benchmark and a distribution of the resid-
ual sequence obtained online. 2) We propose a novel
threshold-detection mechanism, which exploits measure-of-
concentration results to guarantee the robust detection of
an attack with high confidence using a finite set of data,
and which further enables the robust tuning of the false
alarm rate. The proposed detector can effectively identify
real-time attacks when its behavior differs from that of the
system noise. In addition, the detector can handle systems
noises that are not necessarily distributed as Gaussian. 3)
We propose a quantifiable, probabilistic state-reachable set,
which reveals the impact of the stealthy attacker and system
noise in high probability. 4) To implement and analyze the
proposed mechanism, we formulate a linear optimization
problem and a semidefinite problem for the computation
of the detection measure as well as the reachable set,
respectively. We illustrate our methods in a two-dimensional
linear system with irregular noise distributions and stealthy
sensor attacks.
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2Fig. 1: Cyber-Physical System Diagram.
II. CPS AND ITS NORMAL OPERATION
This section presents cyber-physical system (CPS) model,
and underlying assumptions on the system and attacks.
A remotely-observed, cyber-physical system subject to
sensor-measurement attacks, as in Fig. 1, is described as
a discrete-time, stochastic, linear, and time-invariant system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) +w(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t) + γ(t),
(1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rm and y(t) ∈ Rp denote the
system state, input and output at time t ∈ N, respectively.
The state matrix A, input matrix B and output matrix C
are assumed to be known in advance. In particular, we
assume that the pair (A,B) is stabilizable, and (A,C) is
detectable. The process noise w(t) ∈ Rn and output noise
v(t) ∈ Rp are independent zero-mean random vectors.
We assume that each w(t) and v(t) are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time. We denote their
(unknown, not-necessarily equal) distributions by Pw and
Pv , respectively. In addition, we assume that Pw and Pv are
light-tailed1, excluding scenarios of systems operating under
extreme events, or subject to large delays. In fact, Gaussian,
Sub-Gaussian, Exponential distributions, and any distribution
with a compact support set are admissible. This class of
distributions is sufficient to characterize the uncertainty or
noise of many practical problems.
An additive sensor-measurement attack is implemented via
γ(t) ∈ Rp in (1), on which we assume the following
Assumption II.1 (Attack model) It holds that 1) γ(t) = 0
whenever there is no attack; 2) the attacker can modulate any
component of γ(t) at any time; 3) the attacker has unlimited
computational resources and access to system information,
e.g., A, B, C, u, Pw and Pv to decide on γ(t), t ∈ N.
A. Normal System Operation
In what follows, we introduce the state observer that
enables prediction in the absence of attacks (when γ(t) = 0).
Since the distribution of system noise is unknown, we iden-
tify a benchmark distribution that can be used to characterize
this unknown distribution with high confidence.
1 For a random vector w such that w ∼ P, we say P is q-light-tailed,
q = 1, 2, . . ., if c := EP[exp(b‖w‖a)] < ∞ for some a > q and b > 0.
All examples listed have a moment generating function, so their exponential
moment can be constructed for at least q = 1.
To predict (estimate) the system behavior, we leverage the
system information (A,B,C) and employ a Kalman filter
xˆ(t+ 1) = Axˆ(t) +Bu(t) + L(t) (y(t)− yˆ(t)) ,
yˆ(t) = Cxˆ(t),
where xˆ(t) is the state estimate and L(t) ≡ L is the steady-
state Kalman gain matrix. As the pair (A,C) is detectable,
the gain L can be selected in such a way that the eigenvalues
of A−LC are inside the unit circle. This ensures asymptotic
tracking of the state in expectation; that is, the expectation
of the estimation error e(t) := x(t)− xˆ(t) satisfies
E[e(t)]→ 0 as t→∞, for any x(0), xˆ(0).
The further selection of eigenvalues of A−LC and the struc-
ture of L usually depends on additional control objectives
such as noise attenuation requirements. In this paper, we
additionally consider the estimated state feedback
u(t) = Kxˆ(t),
where K is so that the following augmented system is stable2
ξ(t+ 1) = Fξ(t) +Gσ(t), (2)
where ξ(t) := (x(t), e(t))>, σ(t) := (w(t),v(t) + γ(t))>,
F =
[
A+BK −BK
0 A− LC
]
, G =
[
I 0
I −L
]
and some ξ(0).
Remark II.1 (Selection of L and K) In general, the
selection of the matrices L and K for the system (1) is a
nontrivial task, especially when certain performance criteria
are to be satified, such as fast system response, energy
conservation, or noise minimization. However, there are a
few scenarios in which the Separation Principle can be
invoked for a tractable design of L and K. For example,
1) when there is no system noise, matrices L and K can be
designed separately, such that each A+BK and A−LC have
all eigenvalues contained inside the unit circle, respectively.
2) when noise are Gaussian, the gain matrices L and K
can be designed to minimize the steady-state covariance
matrix and control effort, via a separated design of a Kalman
filter (as an observer) and a linear-quadratic regulator (as a
controller). The resulting design is referred to as a Linear-
Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control [16].
Consider the system initially operates normally with the
proper selection of L and K, and assume that the augmented
system (2) is in steady state, i.e., E[ξ(t)] = 0. In order to
design an attack detector later, we need a characterization
of the distribution of the residue r(t) ∈ Rp, which measures
the difference between what we measure and what we expect
to receive, as follows
r(t) := y(t)− yˆ(t) = Ce(t) + v(t) + γ(t).
When there is no attack, it can be verified that the random
vector r(t) is zero-mean, and light-tailed3, and we denote its
2System (2) is input-to-state stable in probability (ISSp) relative to
any compact set A which contains the origin, if we select K such that
eigenvalues of the matrix A+BK are inside the unit circle, see e.g. [15].
3This can be checked from the definition in the footnote 1, and the fact
that r(t) is a linear combination of zero-mean q-light-tailed distributions.
3unknown distribution by Pr. We assume that a finite but large
number N of i.i.d. samples of Pr are accessible, and acquired
by collecting r(t) for a sufficiently large time. We call these
i.i.d. samples a benchmark data set, ΞB := {r(i)}Ni=1, and
construct the resulting empirical distribution Pr,B by
Pr,B :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ{r(i)},
where the operator δ is the mass function and the subscript
B indicates that Pr,B is the benchmark to approximate
the unknown Pr. We can claim that, the benchmark Pr,B
provides a good sense of the effect of the noise on the
system (2) via the following measure concentration result
Theorem II.1 (Measure Concentration [17, Application of
Theorem 2]) If Pr is a q-light-tailed distribution for some
q ≥ 1, then for a given β ∈ (0, 1), the following holds
Prob (dW,q(Pr,B,Pr) ≤ B) ≥ 1− β,
where Prob denotes the Probability, dW,q denotes the q-
Wasserstein metric4 in the probability space, and the pa-
rameter B is selected as
B :=

(
log(c1β
−1)
c2N
)q/a
, if N < log(c1β
−1)
c2
,
¯, if N ≥ log(c1β−1)c2 ,
(3)
for some constant5 a > q, c1, c2 > 0, and ¯ is such that
¯
log(2 + 1/¯)
=
(
log(c1β
−1)
c2N
)1/2
, if p = 2q,
or
¯ =
(
log(c1β
−1)
c2N
)1/max{2,p/q}
, if p 6= 2q,
where p is the dimension of r. 
Theorem II.1 provides a probabilistic bound B on the
q-Wasserstein distance between Pr,B and Pr, with a confi-
dence at least 1 − β. The result indicates how to tune the
parameter β and the number of benchmark samples N that
are needed to find a sufficiently good approximation of Pr,
by means of Pr,B. In this way, given a fixed , we can
increase our confidence (1−β) on whether Pr and Pr,B are
within distance , by increasing the number of samples. We
assume that Pr,B has been determined in advance, selecting
a very large (unique) N to ensure various very small bounds
B associated with various β. Later, we discuss how the
parameter β can be interpreted as a false alarm rate in the
4 Let Mq(Z) denote the space of all q-light-tailed probability distri-
butions supported on Z ⊂ Rp. Then for any two distributions Q1, Q2 ∈
Mq(Z), the q-Wasserstein metric [18] dW,q :Mq(Z)×Mq(Z)→ R≥0
is defined by
dW,q(Q1,Q2) := (min
Π
∫
Z×Z
`q(ξ1, ξ2)Π(dξ1, dξ2))
1/q ,
where Π is in a set of all the probability distributions on Z × Z with
marginals Q1 and Q2. The cost `(ξ1, ξ2) := ‖ξ1 − ξ2‖ is a norm on Z .
5The parameter a is determined as in the definition of Pr and the
constants c1, c2 depend on q, m, and Pr (via a, b, c). When information on
Pr is absent, the parameters a, c1 and c2 can be determined in a data-driven
fashion using sufficiently many samples of Pr . See [17] for details.
proposed attack detector. The resulting Pr,B, with a tunnable
false alarm rate (depending on β), will allow us to design a
detection procedure which is robust to the system noise.
III. THRESHOLD-BASED ROBUST DETECTION OF
ATTACKS, AND STEALTHINESS
This section presents our online detection procedure, and
a threshold-based detector with high-confidence performance
guarantees. Then, we propose a tractable computation of the
detection measure used for online detection. We finish the
section by introducing a class of stealthy attacks.
Online Detection Procedure (ODP): At each time t ≥ T ,
we construct a T -step detector distribution
Pr,D :=
1
T
T−1∑
j=0
δ{r(t−j)},
where r(t− j) is the residue data collected independently at
time t− j, for j ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. Then with a given q and
a threshold α > 0, we consider the detection measure
z(t) := dW,q(Pr,B,Pr,D), (4)
and the attack detector{
z(t) ≤ α, no alarm at t : Alarm(t) = 0,
z(t) > α, alarm at t : Alarm(t) = 1,
(5)
with Alarm(t) the sequence of alarms generated online based
on the previous threshold.
The distribution Pr,D uses a small number T of samples to
ensure the online computational tractability of z(t), so Pr,D
is highly dependent on instantaneous samples. Thus, Pr,D
may significantly deviate from the true Pr, and from Pr,B.
Therefore, even if there is no attack, the attack detector is
expected to generate false alarms due to the system noise
as well as an improper selection of the threshold α. In the
following, we discuss how to select an α that is robust to
the system noise and which results in a desired false alarm
rate. Note that the value α should be small to be able to
distinguish attacks from noise, as discussed later.
Lemma III.1 (Selection of α for Robust Detectors) Given
parameters N , T , q, β, and a desired false alarm rate ∆ > β
at time t, if we select the threshold α as
α := B + D,
where B is chosen as in (3) and D is selected following
the B-formula (3), but with T and ∆−β1−β in place of N and
β, respectively. Then, the detection measure (4) satisfies
Prob (z(t) ≤ α) ≥ 1−∆,
for any zero-mean q-light-tailed underlying distribution Pr.
Due to space limit, please see ArXiv version [19] for proofs.
Proof: The proof leverages the triangular inequality
z(t) ≤ dW,q(Pr,B,Pr) + dW,q(Pr,D,Pr),
the measure concentration result for each dW,q term, and that
samples of Pr,B and Pr,D are collected independently.
4Lemma III.1 ensures that the false alarm rate is no higher
than ∆ when there is no attack, i.e.,
Prob(Alarm(t) = 1 | no attack) ≤ ∆, ∀ t.
Note that the rate ∆ can be selected by properly choosing
the threshold α. Intuitively, if we fix all the other parameters,
then the smaller the rate ∆, the larger the threshold α. Also,
large values of N , T , 1− β contribute to small α.
Remark III.1 (Comparison with χ2-detector) Consider
an alternative detection measure
zχ(t) := r(t)
>
Σ−1r(t),
where Σ is the constant covariance matrix of the residue
r(t) under normal system operation. In particular, if r is
Gaussian, the detection measure zχ(t) is χ2-distributed and
referred to as χ2 detection measure with p degree of freedom.
The detector threshold α is selected via look-up tables of
χ2 distribution, given the desired false alarm rate ∆. To
compare z(t) with zχ(t), we leverage the assumption that r
is Gaussian with the given covariance Σ. This gives explicitly
the expression of z(t) the following
z(t) :=
(
Eξ∼N (r(t),Σ)[‖ξ‖q]
)−1/q
.
By selecting q = 2, we have
z(t) :=
(
r(t)
>
r(t) + Tr(Σ)
)−1/2
.
Note that, the measure-of-concentration result in Theo-
rem II.1 is sharp when r is Gaussian, which in fact results
in the threshold α as tight as that derived for χ2-detector.
Computation of detection measure: To achieve a tractable
computation of the detection measure z(t), we leverage the
definition of the Wasserstein distance (see footnote 4) and
the fact that both Pr,B and Pr,D are discrete. The solution
is given as a linear program.
The Wasserstein distance dW,q(Pr,B,Pr,D), originally
solving the Kantorovich optimal transport problem [18], can
be interpreted as the minimal work needed to move a mass
of points described via a probability distribution Pr,B(r),
on the space Z ⊂ Rp, to a mass of points described by
the probability distribution Pr,D(r) on the same space, with
some transportation cost `. The minimization that defines
dW,q is taken over the space of all the joint distributions Π
on Z ×Z whose marginals are Pr,B and Pr,D, respectively.
Assuming that both Pr,B and Pr,D are discrete, we can
equivalently characterize the joint distribution Π as a discrete
mass optimal transportation plan [18]. To do this, let us con-
sider two sets N := {1, . . . , N} and T := {0, . . . , T − 1}.
Then, Π can be parameterized (by λ) as follows
Πλ(ξ1, ξ2) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈T
λijδ{r(i)}(ξ1)δ{r(t−j)}(ξ2),
s. t.
∑
i∈N
λij =
1
T
, ∀ j ∈ T ,
∑
j∈T
λij =
1
N
, ∀ i ∈ N , (6)
λij ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , j ∈ T . (7)
Note that this characterizes all the joint distributions with
marginals Pr,B and Pr,D, where λ is the allocation of
the mass from Pr,B to Pr,D. Then, the proposed detection
measure z(t) in (4) reduces to the following
(z(t))q := min
λ
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈T
λij‖r(i) − r(t− j)‖q,
s. t. (6), (7),
(P)
which is a linear program over a compact polyhedral set.
Therefore, the solution exists and (P) can be solved to global
optimal in polynomial time by e.g., a CPLEX solver.
A. Detection and Stealthiness of Attacks
Following from the previous discussion, we now introduce
a False Alarm Quantification Problem, then specialize it to
the Attack Detection Problem considered in this paper. In
particular, we analyze the sensitivity of the proposed attack
detector method for the cyber-physical system under attacks.
Problem 1. (False Alarm Quantification Problem): Given
the augmented system (2), the online detection procedure
in Section III, and the attacker type described in Assump-
tion II.1, compute the false alarm rate
Prob(false alarm at t) :=
Prob(Alarm(t) = 1 | no attack) Prob(no attack)
+ Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) Prob(attack).
Problem 1, on the computation of the false alarm proba-
bility, requires prior information of the attack probability
Prob(attack). In this work, we are interested in stealthy
attacks, i.e., attacks that cannot be effectively detected by (5).
We are led to the following problem.
Problem 2. (Attack Detection Problem): Given the setting
of Problem 1, provide conditions that characterize stealthy
attacks, i.e., attacks that contribute to Prob(Alarm(t) =
0 | attack), and quantify their impact on the system.
To remain undetected, the attacker must select γ(t) such
that z(t) is limited to within the threshold α. To quantify the
effects of these attacks, let us consider an attacker sequence
backward in time with length T . At time t, denote the
arbitrary injected attacker sequence by γ(t − j) ∈ Rp,
j ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} (if t−j < 0, assume γ(t−j) = 0). This
sequence, together with (2), results in a detection sequence
{r(t−j)}j that can be used to construct detector distribution
Pr,D and detection measure z(t). For simplicity and w.l.o.g.,
let us assume that γ(t) is in the following form
γ(t) := −Ce(t)− v(t) + γ¯(t), (8)
where γ¯(t) ∈ Rp is any vector selected by the attacker.6 We
characterize the scenarios that can occur, providing a first,
partial answer to Problem 2. Then, we will come back to
characterizing the impact of stealthy attacks in Section IV.
Definition III.1 (Attack Detection Characterization) As-
sume (2) is subject to attack, i.e., γ(t) 6= 0 for some t ≥ 0.
6 Note that, when there is no attack at t, we have γ(t) = 0, resulting in
γ¯(t) = Ce(t) + v(t). Similar techniques appearred in, e.g., [9], [20].
5• If z(t) ≤ α, ∀ t ≥ 0, then the attack is stealthy with
probability one, i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) = 1.
• If z(t) ≤ α, ∀t ≤M , then the attack is M -step stealthy.
• If z(t) > α, ∀t ≥ 0, then the attack is active with
probability one, i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) = 0 | attack) = 0.
Lemma III.2 (Stealthy Attacks Leveraging System Noise)
Assume (2) is subject to attack in form (8), where γ¯(t)
is stochastic and distributed as Pγ¯ . If Pγ¯ is selected such
that dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤ B, then the attacker is stealthy
with (high) probability at least 1−∆1−β , i.e., Prob(Alarm(t) =
0 | attack) ≥ 1−∆1−β .
Proof: Assume (2) is under attack. Then, we prove the
statement leveraging the measure concentration
Prob (dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,D) ≤ D) ≥ 1− ∆− β
1− β ,
which holds as Pr,D is constructed using samples of Pγ¯ , and
the triangular inequality
z(t) ≤ dW,q(Pr,B,Pγ¯) + dW,q(Pr,D,Pγ¯),
resulting in z(t) ≤ α with probability at least 1−∆1−β .
Note that α > B, which allows the attacker to select Pγ¯ with
B < dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤ α. However, the probability of being
stealthy can be indefinitely low, with the range [0, 1−∆1−β ].
IV. STEALTHY ATTACK ANALYSIS
In this section, we address the second question in Prob-
lem 2 via reachable-set analysis. In particular, we achieve an
outer-approximation of the finite-step probabilistic reachable
set, quantifying the effect of the stealthy attacks and the
system noise in probability.
Consider an attack sequence γ(t) as in (8), where γ¯(t) ∈
Rp is any vector such that the attack remains stealthy. That is,
γ¯(t) results in the detected distribution Pr,D, which is close
to Pr,B as prescribed by α. This results in the following
representation of the system (2)
ξ(t+ 1) =
[
A+BK −BK
0 A
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H
ξ(t) +
[
I 0
I −L
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
[
w(t)
γ¯(t)
]
. (9)
We provide in the following remark an intuition of how
restrictive the stealthy attacker’s action γ¯(t) has to be.
Remark IV.1 (Constant attacks) Consider a constant offset
attack γ¯(t) := γ0 for some γ0 ∈ Rp, ∀t. Then by (P),
z(t) = N1−1/q‖γ0 − C(ΞB)‖, C(ΞB) := 1
N
∑
i∈N
r(i).
To ensure stealth, we require z(t) ≤ α, this then limits
the selection of γ0 in a ball centered at C(ΞB) with radius
α/N1−1/q . Note that the radius can be arbitrarily small by
choosing the benchmark size N large.
To quantify the reachable set of the system under attacks,
prior information on the process noise w(t) is needed.
To characterize w(t), let us assume that, similarly to the
benchmark Pr,B, we are able to construct a noise benchmark
distribution, denoted by Pw,B. As before,
Prob (dW,q(Pw,B,Pw) ≤ w,B) ≥ 1− β,
for some w,B. Given certain time, we are interested in
where, with high probability, the state of the system can
evolve from some ξ0. To do this, we consider the M -step
probabilistic reachable set defined as follows
Rx,M :=
x(M) ∈ Rn system (9) with ξ(0) = ξ0,∃ Pw 3 dW,q(Pw,Pw,B) ≤ w,B,∃ Pγ¯ 3 dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤ α,
 ,
then the true system state x(t) at time M , x(M), satisfies
Prob (x(M) ∈ Rx,M ) ≥ 1− β,
where 1− β accounts for the independent restriction of the
unknown distributions Pw to be “close” to its benchmark.
The exact computation of Rx,M is intractable due to the
unbounded support of the unknown distributions Pw and
Pγ¯ , even if they are close to their benchmark. To ensure
a tractable approximation, we follow a two-step procedure.
First, we equivalently characterize the constraints on P by
its probabilistic support set. Then, we outer-approximate the
probabilistic support by ellipsoids, and then the reachable set
by an ellipsoidal bound.
Step 1: (Probabilistic Support of Pγ¯ 3 dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤
α) We achieve this by leveraging 1) the Monge formula-
tion [18] of optimal transport, 2) the fact that Pr,B is discrete,
and 3) results from coverage control [21], [22]. W.l.o.g., let
us assume Pγ¯ is non-atomic (or continuous) and, consider
the distribution Pγ¯ and Pr,B supported on Z ⊂ Rp. Let us
denote by f : Pγ¯ 7→ Pr,B the transport map that assigns
mass over Z from Pγ¯ to Pr,B. The Monge formulation of
optimal transport aims to find an optimal transport map that
minimizes the transportation cost ` as follows
dM,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) :=
(
min
f
∫
Z
`q(ξ, f(ξ))Pγ¯(ξ)dξ
)1/q
.
It is known that if an optimal transport map f? exists, then
the optimal transportation plan Π? exists and the two prob-
lems dM,q and dW,q coincide7. In our setting, for strongly
convex `p, and by the fact that Pγ¯ is absolutely continuous,
a unique optimal transport map can indeed be guaranteed8,
and therefore, dM,q = dW,q .
Let us now consider any transport map f of dM,q, and
define a partition of the support of Pγ¯ by
Wi := {r ∈ Z | f(r) = r(i)}, i ∈ N ,
where r(i) are samples in ΞB, which generate Pr,B. Then,
we equivalently rewrite the value of the objective function
defined in dM,q, as
H(Pγ¯ ,W1, . . . ,WN ) :=
N∑
i=1
∫
Wi
`q(ξ, r(i))Pγ¯(ξ)dξ,
7This is because the Kantorovich transport problem is the tightest
relaxation of the Monge transport problem. See e.g., [18] for details.
8The Monge formulation is not always well-posed, i.e., there exists
optimal transportation plans Π? while transport map does not exist [18].
6s. t.
∫
Wi
Pγ¯(ξ)dξ =
1
N
, ∀ i ∈ N , (10)
where the ith constraints come from the fact that a transport
map f should lead to consistent calculation of set volumes
under Pr,B and Pγ¯ , respectively. This results in the following
equivalent problem to dM,q as
(dM,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B))q := min
Wi,i∈N
H(Pγ¯ ,W1, . . . ,WN ),
s. t. (10).
(P1)
Given the distribution Pγ¯ , Problem (P1) reduces to a load-
balancing problem as in [22]. Let us define the Generalized
Voronoi Partition (GVP) of Z associated to the sample set
ΞB and weight ω ∈ RN , for all i ∈ N , as
Vi(ΞB, ω) :=
{ξ ∈ Z | ‖ξ − r(i)‖q − ωi ≤ ‖ξ − r(j)‖q − ωj , ∀j ∈ N}.
It has been established that the optimal Partition of (P1)
is the GVP [22, Proposition V.1]. Further, the standard
Voronoi partition, i.e., the GVP with equal weights ω¯ := 0,
results in a lower boundof (P1), when constraints (10) are
removed [21], and therefore that of dM,q. We denote this
lower bound as L(Pγ¯ ,V(ΞB)), and use this to quantify a
probabilistic support of Pγ¯ . Let us consider the support set
Ω(ΞB, ) := ∪i∈N
(
Vi(ΞB) ∩ B(r(i))
)
,
where B(r(i)) := {r ∈ Rp | ‖r−r(i)‖ ≤ }. Then we have
the following lemma.
Lemma IV.1 (Probabilistic Support) Let  > 0 and let Pγ¯
be a distribution such that L(Pγ¯ ,V(ΞB)) ≤ q . Then, for any
given s > 1, at least 1− 1/sq portion of the mass of Pγ¯ is
supported on Ω(ΞB, s), i.e.,
∫
Ω(ΞB,s)
Pγ¯(ξ)dξ ≥ 1− 1/sq .
Proof: Suppose otherwise, i.e.,
∫
Rp\Ω(ΞB,s) Pγ¯(ξ)dξ =
1− ∫
Ω(ΞB,s)
Pγ¯(ξ)dξ > 1/sq . Then,
L(Pγ¯ ,V(ΞB)) ≥
∫
Rp\Ω(ΞB,s)
‖ξ − r(i)‖qPγ¯(ξ)dξ,
≥ sqq
∫
Rp\Ω(ΞB,s)
Pγ¯(ξ)dξ > q.
In this way, the support Ω(ΞB, 2α) contains at least 1 −
1/2q of the mass of all the distributions Pγ¯ such that
dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤ α. Equivalently, we have
Prob (γ¯ ∈ Ω(ΞB, 2α)) ≥ 1− 1/2q,
where the random variable γ¯ has a distribution Pγ¯ such that
dW,q(Pγ¯ ,Pr,B) ≤ α. We characterize Pw similarly.
Note that in practice, one can choose ball radius factor
s large in order to generate support which contains higher
portion of the mass of unknown P. However, it comes at a
cost on the approximation of the reachable set.
Step 2: (Outer-approximation of Rx,M ) Making use of the
probabilistic support, we can now obtain a finite-dimensional
characterization of the probabilistic reachable set, as follows
Rx,M :=
x(M) ∈ Rn system (9), ξ(0) = ξ0,w ∈ Ω(Ξw,B, 2w,B),γ¯ ∈ Ω(ΞB, 2α)
 ,
and the true system state x(t) at time M , x(M), satisfies
Prob (x(M) ∈ Rx,M ) ≥ (1 − β)(1 − 1/2q)2. Many works
focus on the tractable evolution of geometric shapes; e.g. [9],
[13]. Here, we follow [13] and propose outer ellipsoidal
bounds for Rx,M . Let Qw be the positive-definite shape
matrix such that Ω(Ξw,B, w,B) ⊂ Ew := {w | w>Qww ≤
1}. Similarly, we denote Qγ¯ and Eγ¯ for that of γ¯. We now
state the following lemma, that applies [13, Proposition 1]
for our case.
Lemma IV.2 (Outer bounds of Rx,M ) Given any a ∈
[0, 1), we claim Rx,M ⊂ E(Q) := {x ∈ Rn | ξ>Qξ ≤
aMξ0
>Qξ0 +
(2−a)(1−aM )
1−a }, with Q satisfying
Q  0,
 aQ H>Q 0QH Q QG
0 G>Q W
  0, (11)
where H , G are that in (9) and
W =
[
(1− a1)Qw 0
0 (1− a2)Qγ¯
]
,
for some a1 + a2 ≥ a, a1, a2 ∈ [0, 1).
(12)
A tight reachable set bound can be now derived by solving
min
Q,a1,a2
− log det(Q),
s. t. (11), (12),
(P2)
which is a convex semidefinite program, solvable via e.g.,
SeDuMi [23]. Note that the probabilistic reachable set is
Rx := ∪∞M=1Rx,M ,
which again can be approximated via Q? solving (P2) for9
Rx ⊂ E(Q?) = {x ∈ Rn | ξ>Q?ξ ≤ (2− a)
1− a }.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate the performance of the
proposed attack detector, illustrating its distributional ro-
bustness w.r.t. the system noise. Then, we consider stealthy
attacks as in (8) and analyze their impact by quantifying the
probabilistic reachable set and outer-approximation bound.
Consider the stochastic system (2), given as
A =
[
1.00 0.10
−0.20 0.75
]
, B =
[
0.10
0.20
]
, L =
[
0.23
−0.20
]
,
C =
[
1 0
]
, K =
[−0.13 0.01] , n = 2, m = p = 1,
w1 ∼ N (−0.25, 0.02) + U(0, 0.5), v ∼ U(−0.3, 0.3),
w2 ∼ N (0, 0.04) + U(−0.2, 0.2),
where N and U represent the normal and uniform distri-
butions, respectively. We consider N = 103 benchmark
samples for Pr,B and T = 102 real-time samples for Pr,D.
We select the parameter q = 1, β = 0.01 and false alarm
rate ∆ = 0.05. We select the prior information of the system
9The set Rx is in fact contained in the projection of E(Q?) onto the
state subspace, i.e., Rx ⊂ {x | x>
(
Qxx−QxeQ−1ee Qxe>
)
x ≤ (2−a)
1−a }
with Q? :=
[
Qxx Qxe
Qxe> Qee
]
. See, e.g., [13] for details.
7Fig. 2: Statistics of z. Fig. 3: Probabilistic Support of Pw. Fig. 4: Empirical and Bound of Rx.
noise via parameters a = 1.5, c1 = 1.84×106 and c2 = 12.5.
Using the measure-of-concentration results, we determine the
detector threshold to be α = 0.158. In the normal system
operation (no attack), we run the online detection procedure
for 104 time steps and draw the distribution of the computed
detection measure z(t) as in Fig. 2. We verify that the false
alarm rate is 3.68%, within the required rate ∆ = 5%.
When the system is subject to stealthy attacks, we assume
ξ0 = 0 and visualize the Voronoi partition V(Ξw,B) (con-
vex sets with blue boundaries) of the probabilistic support
Ω(Ξw,B, w,B) and its estimated ellipsoidal bound (red line)
as in Fig. 3. Further, we demonstrate the impact of the
stealthy attacks (8), as in Fig. 4. We used 104 empirical
points of Rx as its estimate and provided an ellipsoidal
bound of Rx computed by solution of (P2). It can be seen
that the proposed probabilistic reachable set effectively cap-
tures the reachable set in probability. Due to the space limits,
we omit the comparison of our approach to the existing ones,
such as the classical χ2 detector in [9] and the CUMSUM
procedure [8]. However, the difference should be clear: our
proposed approach is robust w.r.t. noise distributions while
others leverage the moment information up to the second
order, which only capture sufficient information about certain
noise distributions, e.g., Gaussian.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A novel detection measure was proposed to enable dis-
tributionally robust detection of attacks w.r.t. unknown, and
light-tailed system noise. The proposed detection measure
restricts the behavior of the stealthy attacks, whose impact
was quantified via reachable-set analysis.
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